strictly just."
2 One could imagine the pope making the very same claim, but this would be to misunderstand Ockham's point. It is true that Ockham probably had little chance of convincing the pope of the coherence of his position. But this is not to say that his position was untenable.
A common criticism of Ockham's theory of poverty is that he was, more or less, fighting on John XXII's own terms, which generally also leads to the conclusion that Ockham's theory is deficient in some respect.
3 But if Ockham can be accused of fighting on the pope's ground because he responded to Quia vir reprobus point-by-point, then the pope can equally be accused of fighting on Michaelist ground because he was doing essentially the same thing. Alternatively, this claim might be interpreted as meaning that Ockham accepted as axiomatic certain claims of John XXII and then proceeded to construct an alternate theory to that of the pope's; consequently, this argument would continue, because Ockham could not get past certain foundational statements he was unable to properly address in the pope's claims. It is a corollary of the argument presented here that this was not the case.
One of the paradoxes of the Franciscan modus vivendi was that, although their goal was to disengage from the civil order as far as all property relationships went, 4 and despite the fact that Francis strongly commanded all brothers "through obedience" ( Bonaventure, 1978] , 227) put it, the brothers were to live sine proprio, and that they nihil sibi approprient nec domum nec locum nec aliquam rem (6.1 [231] ); cf. Regula non bullata 1.1 (242). 5 Testamentum 25 (Esser, 312-13). The problem of obedience deserves its own treatment, but cf. Francis's comments in Admonitiones 3.5-11 (64-papacy for all sorts of things.
6 It is easy to see how this paradoxical relationship with the papacy could lead to trouble for the order, and indeed it was in the course of one of these appeals that the "Franciscan crisis under John XXII" might be said to have begun. 7 The story, recounted by a Minorite who leaves no doubt as to his partisanship, is that when a Franciscan, Berengar Talon (coincidentally the current holder of Peter Olivi's former chair in Narbonne), defended a Beguin's view that Christ and his disciples possessed nothing, "either individually or in common, by right of ownership and lordship" against the Dominican inquisitor Jean de Beaune, the latter accused Berengar, too, of heresy. Not surprisingly, given the historical success of this method, Berengar appealed to the pope. vows, poverty was the least important.
11 The pope, probably following Hervaeus Natalis, 12 was equally convinced that "the perfection of the Christian life consists principally and essentially in charity,"
13 and that obedience to one's superiors was of prime importance for any religious. As he had already said, without obedience, a religio, a regular way of life, is destroyed, for "great, indeed, is poverty, but chastity is greater, [and] of these the greatest is obedience-if it is preserved intact."
14 In short, aside from any of the theoretical considerations which would mark the controversy of the 1320s, it is safe to say that John did not share earlier popes' views on the innate value of poverty.
15 It is not surprising that he felt the ). 15 Significantly, Gregory IX, Alexander IV, and Nicholas III had all been Cardinal protectors to the Franciscans. Conversely, John's views on poverty have often been compared to those of Aquinas (whom he read carefully), who is often thought to be a proponent of an "instrumental-Friars Minor were "vainly boasting" (inaniter gloriari) about the "highest poverty" which, apparently, only they practiced.
16
Whatever the deeper motivations for re-kindling the whole poverty debate, then, it seems reasonable enough to assume that if the pope thought that the traditional line about the order's poverty was a cause of dissension both within the order and without the order-as he indeed did 17 -it is also not surprising that he would be willing to abrogate a fundamental aspect of Franciscan poverty which had in one fashion or another characterized the order for decades.
18
If we had to boil John's whole theory of ownership 19 down to one essential point, it would be that it is impossible to justly use anything without some sort of right to do so. In the case of consumables this meant a property right, such as lordship or ownership; for everything else, at least a right of ist" theory of poverty. Cf 19 It is instructive to bear in mind the attempt of Tony Honoré, "Ownership," in Making Law Bind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 165, to specify the essential features, or "incidents" of the modern "liberal concept of full individual ownership," which he said "comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissability and absence of term, the duty to prevent harm, liability to execution, and the incident of residuarity." He discussed the implications of this definition in the following pages.
using. 20 The reason for this distinction is due to John's strict interpretation of the term "use." The earliest clear account of use comes from the redacted version of ACC, where he maintained that use, which is [like usufruct] also a personal servitude, is nothing but a right of using another's goods with the substance of the thing preserved-that is, the right of securing in his own name the fruits and some advantage, in whole or in part, which can come from the thing in which usufruct or use is established.
21
Although John did not deign to mention his source here, he was simply expanding a little on Azo's definition of "bare use," which stated that "use is a right of using another's goods with the substance preserved. John also creatively interpreted the traditional Franciscan claim that they only had simple use of fact.
25 Able lawyer that he was, John refused to understand "of fact" as anything other than an act or a deed, even though it was not uncommon to use the word to mark a distinction from ius. That is, in legal discourse, it was not uncommon for there to be a "fact"/"law" distinction;
26 we need only think of the phrases "de facto" and "de iure" to see how this distinction holds even today.
27
Hence the pope was trading on a very specific reading of "of fact" when he came to explain what earlier popes had meant when they granted the order "the use of utensils, books, and movable goods which are licit to have."
28 According to John, since this use was granted to the order in general, this had to be a use of right, because "facts, which are a characteristic of individuals, demand and require a true person"-and an order, of course, is not a true person but should be considered rights to use (usus), the rights to fruits (fructus), and the right of disposal (abusus).
32
In addition to his refusal to allow use to mean anything other than a right of using, John also denied the Michaelist claim that their use by license, a licentia utendi, did not also entail a right of using. That is, according to John, no act of using can be considered separate from its liceity or justness.
33
In fact, he argued from the licitness of an act to the justness of an act, and he thought Exiit made this point for him:
34
It does not seem probable that the author of the canon meant to reserve such a not-just use to the friars. We must assume that Friedberg's text is incorrect: for the first, even John used usus facti when referring to this section of Exiit, and for the second, the only order to which this really applies is that of the Franciscans.
35 I follow G/F, 166, here and ignore the non ("non intellexit") added by Tarrant (276: preserved in n. 37 below). As her second apparatus lectionum makes clear, the so-called official version of the bull does not have the non either. Obviously, a third non would negate the point John was trying to make. 36 The same holds here as in the note above, but, even more importantly, her text (276 [l. 230]: quare, emended from quarum) ignores the fact that this is an essentially verbatim quotation of ACC 2 194-204 (245-46), der would be permitted to have a use of fact; [and] he added that these brothers must not have the use of all things. But as far as it relates to a simple use of fact without any right of using, no distinction of the things can be supposed as far as the brothers are concerned. For they can, de facto, use prohibited things like they can use permitted things. From this it follows that the use of fact (about which the decree [Exiit] speaks) must be understood about such use that is just, and for which a right of using coincides.
37
There are a few things to note in this passage. First of all, although John could conceive of a "de facto use" which is without a right of using (for this is to use "forbidden" things), he refused to relate this notion to simple use of fact.
38 In reality, as far as the friars are concerned, there is no difference (differentia) when it comes to use. In other words, John was which has the latter reading. G/F, 166, reads "quarum" as well. Heft (1) that this type of "usus" is not use "properly speaking," and (2) that it is of the unjust variety which the friars are to avoid.
arguing for an equation of just use and licit use, for he began by agreeing that Nicholas III wished to reserve a just use to the friars, but also forbade them to use indiscriminately anything whatsoever. Licit use came from the point that only certain things were permitted for use. Since using things which are not permitted is wrong, such acts of using cannot be just. Licit use, therefore, is just use. Just use, however, presupposed a right of using: "Indeed, it is impossible that an extrinsic human act be just if the one exercising that act has no right of exercising it; rather, such a use is clearly proven to be not-just or unjust."
39 Since, he argued, just use presupposed a right of using, 40 then truly licit use itself must also involve a right of using.
The connection between licit use and just use holds even in cases where the owner has granted the would-be user a license of using. As John said, "if in fact someone grants a license of using his usable thing to another, to the extent that the license holds, it is agreed that he to whom the license was conceded has a right of using that thing."
41 This connection is controlled by the fact that John posited an absolute dichotomy between just and unjust acts, which was fundamental to his whole position in the poverty controversy. Thus, in response to Michael of Cesena's claim that a license is different from a right, 42 John countered by asking whether this licensed use was supposed to be just, unjust, or neither.
If he says "unjustly," it certainly agrees with the aforesaid constitution [ right-for what is done justly is also done by right: X 5.40.12; 43 C. 14 q. 4 c. 11. If, however, he says that the one to whom the license is conceded uses neither justly nor unjustly, this is false. For it is impossible that an individual human act be indifferent, that is, neither good nor evil, neither just nor unjust. For since it is called a human act which proceeds from a deliberate will, and, consequently, which acts for some end which it recognizes as the object of the will, it is necessary that, if the end of the act is good, that the act itself be good. If, however, the end is evil, it is necessary that the act be evil.
44
Since there are no indifferent actions, it is possible to say that every act is just or unjust in so far as each is good or bad.
45 What is significant here is that John has effectively 43 This decretal has been discussed by claimed that the spheres of morality and law are co-extensive. What is unjust cannot be licit, and since just use requires a right of using, so too must licit use; and, therefore, so too must licensed use. The way John saw it, when a friar used something, be it a stick found in the wilderness or the Basilica of St. Francis, he either had the right to do so, or he used it unjustly and wrongly-like a thief.
ockham on the scoPe of laW
Much more could be said about John's position on the issue of Franciscan poverty, but this would take us beyond the issues of use, which was the locus of the pope's most devastating attack against the theory of poverty. When Ockham entered the fray, much ink had already been spilt. Not to be outdone, Ockham produced his own work, probably as useful for convincing opponents of the reasonableness of the Michaelist position as it was short. However, his long and complex refutation of John's position in the Opus nonaginta dierum (c. 1332), 46 at least as far as John's problems with just and licit use are concerned, is sound. To demonstrate this, there is no need for a complete account of Ockham's theory of property rights; but we must consider three things: the scope of natural and positive law ( § 2); the difference be- 
tween rights and licenses ( § 3);
47 and the disjunction of law and morality ( § 4).
Unlike his famous discussion of natural law in the Dialogus, Ockham's account in the OND is fairly straightforward.
48
In the OND Ockham connected Augustine's "law of heaven" 49 to natural law:
A law of heaven is called natural equity, which is consonant with right reason (whether it be consonant with purely natural right reason, or right reason taken from those things which are divinely revealed to us), without any human decree or even a purely positive divine decree. For this reason, this law is sometimes called "natural law," because every natural law pertains to the "law of heaven."
50
According to Ockham, then, a "law of heaven" is natural equity, which is harmonious with right reason. 51 The term 47 Ockham, like many others, used ius to mean both "right" and "law," but he switched from one meaning to the other frequently and without comment; on this, see Tierney "natural equity" is revealing, as is the fact that the law of heaven does not depend on specific decrees (ordinationes) for its inherent validity. It is for this reason that Ockham can uphold the traditional canonistic notion that necessity has no law.
52 This point, we shall see, served as the basis for a legitimization of use that did not require a foundation in positive law.
In terms of positive, or civil, law, Ockham (like others before him) believed that it has legitimate force only where it does not contravene natural or divine law. That is, natural law encompasses positive law, but in certain instances it "permits" positive law to legislate, namely when some law is beneficial to society, but which has no essential connection to right reason. For example, outside of appeals to etymology, there is no real reason why driving on the right-hand side of the street is "right"; that is to say, it is not contrary to right reason to drive on the left-hand side of the street.
53 Hence, then, the point that positive law is a ius fori, a law of the forum.
Unlike a law of heaven, a law of the forum, which has its origins in a pact (pactio) or a decree, has no essential connection to right reason. 54 The significance of the distinction can be explained thus: possession by the law of the forum alone is not a sufficient guarantee that one possesses well, but possession by the law of heaven is.
55 "Possessing well" as it is understood in relation to right reason, then, has no immediate or essential connection to positive law; even so, once a law or right (ius) has been humanly established through a pact, it must not be violated at will.
56 Thus we might say that individuals' property rights are to be respected, but we need not say that an avaricious miser who ignores the plight of the neighbouring poor possesses "well" even though he does so by law. 53 
Rights and licenses
As we noted earlier, one of John XXII's fundamental positions was that use was nothing less than a right of using. Ockham disagreed. He drew a sharp distinction between use as a legal concept and use as an action. One way to talk about this distinction is to use the terms "use of right" and "use of fact."
57 Use of right may be grounded in natural or positive law, which means one can have a natural or positive use of right.
Natural rights, of course, are irrenounceable:
The abdication of the natural right to the use of a thing is ungodly since no one is permitted to renounce that right. For he who renounces such a right would be unable to preserve his own life from another's goods in a critical moment of extreme necessity without the other's license-which is not true.
58
Because this natural right comes from nature and not from a "supervening" constitution, this natural right of using is common to the entire human race. "But," he added, although every person may have such a right of using at every occasion, he does not have it for every occasion. For those who have nothing individually or in common, although they may have a right of using another's goods, nevertheless they do not have that right except for the time of extreme necessity: in which time they may licitly use every present thing (without which their life could not be preserved) on the strength of the law of nature. However, at another time they could not use another's goods on the authority of that law. The point here is that just because we can claim a natural right of using does not mean we can go about willy-nilly, ignoring existing positive law-based property rights. Indeed, one of the most conspicuous features of Ockham's political writings is the canon law gloss that "no one ought to be deprived of his right without fault and without cause."
60 Since, say, eating the fruits of someone else's field clearly does deprive someone of their right to the fruits of their field, what Ockham was saying was that you had to be really, really hungry before you invoked your claim to a superseding right of using those fruits.
In the course of day-to-day life, however, we tend to deal more with a positive law-based right of using. According to Ockham, a right of using was "licit power of using an external thing which one must not be deprived of unwillingly without any fault on his part and without rational cause," and then specified that "if he were deprived, he could prosecute the depriver in court."
Verumtamen, licet omnis homo habeat omni tempore tale ius utendi, non tamen habet tale ius utendi rebus pro omni tempore. Illi enim, qui nullas res habent proprias neque communes, licet habeant ius utendi rebus alienis, non tamen habent ius utendi rebus alienis nisi pro tempore necessitatis
61 In other words, a right of using is the combination of two elements, a "licit power of using" and the ability to defend this power in court.
62 This was one place where no rapprochement was possible between Ockham and the pope, for the latter maintained that there was a real difference between a ius utendi and a ius agendi. 63 This was essentially a difference of canon and civil law: John, thinking of civil law, had reason to argue thus; 64 and Ockham, for his part, defended his point by reference to canon law.
65 However, Ockham further divides the power of using from issues of liceity. All people, indeed all animals, 66 have a God-given power of using. By itself, this power of using is enough to licitly use an unowned thing; in Ockham's example, derelict clothing which belongs to nobody. owned by someone, the situation is a little more complicated. Even in this case, however, for a use of fact to be licit, only two conditions generally (communiter) need to hold: (1) that such a use of fact is not prohibited to the one wishing to use; and (2) that the person have a license of using from one who can grant such a license. In other words, there need not be some sort of concession of individual or common lordship.
68 Ockham further explained that use under these circumstances did not entail the acquisition of lordship, which, he insisted, depended upon the will.
69 Unwittingly or not, this kept Ockham in line with the civil law interpretation favoured by John.
70 It is easy to see why using, say, a stick found in the wilderness is "licit," but obviously when the stick belongs to someone else, I cannot licitly use it whenever I wish. Hence the need for a license of using.
For when someone is impeded from using some temporal thing by this alone: that the thing is someone else's … the permission of the one whose thing it is, which is declared through a license, is alone enough to use the thing by the law of heaven. Through a permission, moreoever, and consequently through a license, only the impediment prohibiting the one who has a natural right of using to perform an act of using is removed; and no new right is conferred upon him. 70 In the case of acquisition of a res nullius, it is occupanti conceditur (Inst. 2.1.12 [1:10-11]), but occupatio itself, "acquisition of ownership by taking possession," implies intent to possess, for possessio includes both the factual possession and the desire to keep control over the thing (animus possedendi); see Berger, "Encyclopedic Dictionary," svv. "occupatio" (606) and "possessio" (637 Perhaps we should clarify that a license can be a grace, for there are irrevocable licenses-he mentioned monk's license from a religious superior to enter a different order.
77
But a license of using was different in that it permitted the license-holder to use the thing in question, but it did not imply any correlative duty on the part of others, particularly the owner(s), to refrain from arbitrarily revoking the license at some point. 78 To carry the example of the stick a little further, should I grant you a license of using it, you would now be free to employ your innate power of using, and by the grace of the license, the resulting use would be licit. However, I may at any time, for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever, revoke the license; at which point, any subsequent use would cease to be licit, and while you would have no legal recourse if you desired to continue using the stick, I would be within my rights to prosecute you if you continued to do so.
79 Such a license, furthermore, has no essential connection to positive law. As Ockham argued, a "license which can be revoked at the pleasure of the granter by the law of the forum, is hardly 'de gratia', to bolster this distinction. Cf. Ockham's point that a privation of grace potest esse sine culpa: 4 Sent. q. 11 (OTh 7:195 to be thought of as a law of the forum."
80 And because they are not actionable, they cannot be considered rights.
81 This is significant since one of Ockham's goals was to argue for a general separation of positive law and morality. The existence of a non-actionable license of using explained how a friar could employ a licit power of using a thing without first having a right to do so; now all that remained was for Ockham to show that such an action could still be "just."
4 the disJUnction of laW and moRality John, we remember, had posed this problem: Use conceded by a license must be just, unjust or neither.
82 The pope concluded that this argument proved use had to be just, which meant that any act of using, even that done by the grace of a license, had to have a right of using.
For his reply, Ockham pointed out that we can speak about justice in three different ways.
83
J1 A particular virtue, distinct from the other three cardinal virtues, according to which a man acts justly toward another; J2 A general virtue, namely "legal justice," which orders all acts of virtue toward the common good; Acts, therefore, may be said to be just or not according to the same scheme.
85 With this threefold distinction, Ockham responded to John's challenge in two ways. First, he showed that the pope had confused "legally just" with the (more generic) cardinal virtue; second, he showed that even according to the pope's own authority for his argument, we can say that acts are "just" in yet another way. That is, according to J1, an act of using can be neither just nor unjust, for there are many meritorious acts, and vice versa, which are neither just nor unjust, and yet are good or bad, praise-or blameworthy. Alternatively, in the case of J3, someone justly uses a thing with a license of using when this action conforms to right reason.
86 That is, the person does use "by right" (iure), but 84 Ockham goes on to quote from STh 2a2ae.58.2 ad 1 (9:11). Ockham's purpose is clear: Aquinas, whom John canonized, and who served as John's source for the dilemma he had posed, would agree with the Michaelists on this point, not the pope. 85 this is by the law of heaven, not the law of the forum.
87 In other words, the pope's point that for acts to be just one must have at least a right of (ab-)using fails because regardless of their legal status (J2), such acts are neither just nor unjust (J1), and can easily be just (J3). That is, the justness of an act according to J2 may be one consideration, but it pales in comparison to the larger question of whether the act is, or can be, just in the sense of J1 or J3.
The point here was that we cannot make a strict identification of positive law with morality.
88 In fact, rather than say that an action must be legally just for it to be morally good, Ockham seems to have thought it would be better if the opposite were true. 89 In this sense, an act of using may be morally good and consonant with right reason, and therefore just in the third sense, even if (and Ockham had his doubts about this) civil law were to demand that use and lordship of a thing cannot remain forever separate.
conclUsion
We may say by way of conclusion then that there is no foundation to the claim that "although [Ockham] contested every position he was still accepting the pope's doctrine and the pope's arguments as the basis of his own replies."
90 Rather, if we had to summarize Ockham's general problems with the pope's arguments, it would be that John was wrong to try to account for the entire theory of usus within the scope of positive law. According to the version of John's theory presented here, his strict definition of use meant that one must have at least a right of using, or, in the case of consumables, since that use could not exist at all, one must have the right to the ab-use, or consumption. This understanding also controlled his understanding of licit use, which had to involve the same rights in order to avoid being considered unjust use. For his part, Ockham thought all of this was nonsense. There was no essential connection between law and morality. As positive law came about through agreements (pactiones) between people, 91 or have their source in a ruler's decree (ordinatio), this law is not necessarily related to right reason, which is what is intimately tied to questions of morality.
92
Thus, actions may easily be "just" in some sense of the word without reference to positive law; in fact, some actions may even be "indifferent" as far as positive law is concerned.
Such is the case with the "license of using." Naturally, licenses can fall under the purview of positive law, but not all need to. As Ockham saw it, a license had by the grace of someone else could operate "outside" of the jurisdiction of positive law, provided, of course, that they do not violate existing laws. On the analogy that a prince is "freed" from his own laws, 93 the granter of a license is likewise not bound by the conditions he sets. Licenses are therefore revocable at the whim of the granter. But a license of using does not grant a right of using; nor are the terms equivalent. The difference is simple: a right of using offers recourse to legal action, while a license does not.
All a license offers is the opportunity to make use of our "most general power of using." 94 This power is present whenever we make use of something, and it is the accompany-ing circumstances which allow us to describe it in different ways. When we make use of something as its owner or as the usufructuary, then this licit power of using is accompanied by a right of using. If our use is impeded, the reason we have recourse to the courts is not because the power of using is something protected by law, but because our claim as owner or usufructuary is. When we make illicit use of something (like a thief does), we are not convicted as such because we have employed this power of using, but because, by doing so, we have infringed upon the rights and claims of others. When we are granted only a license of using and all the limitations this entails, when we use our innate power of using, if our use is impeded there is precious little we can do about it (other than complain).
In other words, Ockham was arguing that (1) because positive law necessarily had to exist "within" natural law in so far as the former can never legitimately contradict the latter, and (2) because there are actions whose justness or liceity depends only on natural law, not all actions need rely on the ordinances or pacts of positive law. A license of using, then, which is "permitted" under natural law, could be licit and just outside of the concerns of positive law. Our power of using, however, is always present-even if it is only licit while the one granting a license of using says it is.
